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hoW envIronmenTAl revIeW cAn GenerATe 
cAr-Induced PolluTIon: A cAse sTudy
By Michael Lewyn*
I. InTroducTIon
The National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”)
1 
requires federal officials to draft an environmental 
impact statement (“EIS”) describing the environmental 
impact of proposed federal actions that significantly affect the 
environment, as well as analyze the environmental impacts of 
alternatives to the proposed action.2 Almost two dozen states 
have adopted “little NEPA” statutes imposing similar require-
ments upon state and/or local governments.3
This article focuses on one of the strictest little NEPA 
statutes: New York’s State Environmental Quality Review Act 
(“SEQRA”).4 While most little NEPA statutes cover only gov-
ernment projects,5 SEQRA also covers private sector projects 
requiring municipal permits.6 Furthermore, SEQRA requires the 
government to consider both environmental and social impacts 
of its actions,7 unlike NEPA8 and about half of the existing little 
NEPA statutes.9
This article contends that the stringencies of SEQRA occa-
sionally have harmful environmental consequences because 
SEQRA can easily be used to delay “infill development”—that 
is, development in already-developed areas such as cities and 
older suburbs. When this occurs, development may shift from 
older areas to “greenfields,” newer suburbs that tend to be more 
dependent on automobiles and thus to produce more pollution.
Part II of this article introduces readers to SEQRA. Part 
III shows how SEQRA discourages infill development. Part IV 
explains that because greenfield sites tend to be in areas with 
little public transit, generating more automobile traffic than infill 
sites, SEQRA’s bias towards greenfield development is environ-
mentally harmful. Part V suggests possible reforms to SEQRA, 
including borrowing from California’s little NEPA law.
II. a brIeF GuIde To seqra
The federal government enacted NEPA in 197010 to 
ensure that federal agencies considered the potential environ-
mental impact of their actions.11 The White House Council on 
Environmental Quality (“CEQ”) has promulgated regulations 
that implement NEPA’s provisions.12 Under these regulations, 
the agency proposing and/or permitting the action, known as 
the “lead agency,”13 will typically14 begin the environmental 
review process by preparing an Environmental Assessment 
(“EA”), a document which “[b]riefly provide[s] sufficient 
evidence and analysis for determining whether to prepare an 
environmental impact statement.”15 If after drafting the EA the 
lead agency decides that its actions will not create a significant 
environmental impact, it will issue a “Finding of No Significant 
Impact” (“FONSI”) instead of an EIS.16
On the other hand, if the lead agency decides that its actions 
might create a significant impact,17 it requests comments from 
the public and other government agencies asking what issues it 
should study in the EIS.18 After reviewing these comments, the 
agency prepares a draft EIS19 and—after soliciting additional 
public comment—a final EIS.20 The EIS must address not only 
the environmental impacts of the proposed action but also any 
possible alternatives to the proposal.21
New York state’s little NEPA statute, SEQRA, is almost 
as old as NEPA; it was enacted in 1975 and became effective 
the following year.22 Just as NEPA is designed to make federal 
action more environmentally sensitive, SEQRA is designed to 
make state government more environmentally sensitive.23 Unlike 
NEPA, however, SEQRA applies not only to state government 
action but also to actions by local governments,24 including 
rezonings25 and other land use-related permits.26
Like NEPA, SEQRA creates a multi-step environmental 
review process. The lead agency begins the process by drafting 
an environmental assessment form (“EAF”) to determine how its 
proposed action will affect the environment.27 If the lead agency 
concludes that environmental impacts from its action are unlikely 
to be significant, it drafts a “negative declaration” which, like a 
FONSI, declares that “implementation of the action as proposed 
will not result in any significant environmental impacts.”28
But if the environmental assessment identifies potentially 
significant environmental impacts, the agency issues a “positive 
declaration” announcing that the impacts require an EIS.29 The 
state agency then begins the “scoping process”30 designed to 
produce an EIS. This process begins when the agency prepares a 
draft EIS and solicits public comments on that document.31
After receiving public comments on the draft EIS, the 
agency issues a final EIS.32 If circumstances change or if the 
agency alters the project, the agency may also issue a supple-
mental EIS.33 The final EIS must address the adverse impacts of 
the proposed action, including but not limited to: growth-induc-
ing impacts, impacts upon energy use and conservation, and 
impacts on solid waste management; any reasonable alternatives 
to the proposed action; and any commitments of environmental 
resources, such as land or construction materials34 associated 
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with the proposed action.35 In addition, a final EIS must address 
all comments on the draft EIS, as well as any project changes, 
new information, and changes in circumstances since the issu-
ance of the draft EIS.36 Before proceeding with the proposed 
action the agency must certify that the action minimizes adverse 
environmental impacts to the maximum extent practicable and 
that the agency will use any mitigating measures identified as 
practicable in the EIS.37 Citizens may challenge an agency deci-
sion, including either an EIS or a decision not to issue an EIS, 
under SEQRA.38
New York’s Department of Environmental Conservation 
(“DEC”) has enacted regulations to guide state and local govern-
ments in deciding whether to issue an EIS.39 These regulations 
provide that for “Type I”40 government projects, a rebuttable pre-
sumption exists that the project creates environmental impacts 
significant enough to require the preparation of a full EIS.41 For 
example, Type I actions include all zoning changes affecting 
twenty-five or more acres.42
On the other hand, the regulations categorically exclude 
thirty-seven types of actions, known as “Type II” actions, from 
SEQRA scrutiny.43 For example, zoning decisions affecting just 
one house are usually Type II actions.44 Government actions 
that are neither Type I nor Type II are labeled by the regulations 
as “unlisted actions”45 and may require an EIS if they create a 
significant impact.46 The overwhelming majority of government 
actions subject to SEQRA are unlisted.47
In addition to creating the Type I/Type II/unlisted hier-
archy, SEQRA differs from NEPA in another major48 respect. 
NEPA is limited to actions affecting “the quality of the human 
environment”49—a phrase that courts have limited to “effects 
on the natural or physical environment.”50 By contrast, SEQRA 
defines the relevant “environment” not just as “the physical con-
ditions which will be affected by a proposed action [such as] 
land, air, water, minerals, flora [and] fauna”51 but also “objects of 
historic or aesthetic significance, existing patterns of population 
concentration, distribution or growth, and existing community 
or neighborhood character.”52 For example, the New York courts 
have interpreted this language to mean that any government 
action that induces a significant change in population patterns 
requires an environmental impact statement.53
This does not mean, however, that agencies may never 
engage in environmentally harmful actions. Instead, agencies 
must disclose the environmental impact of their actions in the 
EIS,54 and must “minimize adverse environmental effects to the 
maximum extent practicable.”55 In determining what is “prac-
ticable,” agencies may balance environmental concerns against 
other public policies.56
On review, courts may not “weigh the desirability of any 
action or choose among alternatives”57 but must ascertain 
whether the EIS and the agency’s decision were arbitrary, capri-
cious, or otherwise infected by errors of law or procedure.58 As 
a practical matter, this means courts generally uphold agency 
decisions, especially after an EIS has been filed.59
III. seqra and InFIll develoPmenT
Infill development is development that occurs in already-
developed neighborhoods, often in cities or older suburbs.60 
Greenfield development, by contrast, occurs on “pristine, 
undeveloped land typically located in low density suburban 
areas.”61 Both types of development sometimes require rezon-
ing or similar legal changes62 and may be subject to SEQRA.63 
But SEQRA’s broad definition of “environmental impact” means 
that urban infill projects will often require an EIS, even if they 
create no impact upon the physical environment.64 Although the 
statute does not expressly favor greenfield development, green-
field projects may nevertheless be less likely to attract the kind 
of public controversy that forces agencies to draft an EIS.65
A. The Environmental Impacts of Infill
As noted above, SEQRA defines the term “environment” to 
include “existing patterns of population concentration, distribu-
tion or growth, and existing community or neighborhood char-
acter.”66 SEQRA’s broad definition of the term “environment” 
suggests that any infill development that adds a significant num-
ber of residences or businesses to an existing neighborhood will 
usually require an EIS, since such development affects “existing 
patterns of population” and “neighborhood character.”67
The New York Court of Appeals addressed this issue in the 
1986 decision of Chinese Staff and Workers Association v. City 
of New York (“Chinese Staff I”).68 In that case, a developer pro-
posed to build a high-rise condominium on a vacant lot in New 
York’s Chinatown neighborhood.69 The city declined to draft 
an EIS on the ground that the project would have no significant 
environmental impact.70 Members of the Chinatown community 
filed suit, alleging that the city’s decision was erroneous because 
the city failed to consider “whether the introduction of luxury 
housing into the Chinatown community would accelerate the 
displacement of local low-income residents and businesses or 
alter the character of the community.”71 In response, the city 
argued that this risk was “outside the scope of the [SEQRA] 
definition of environment.”72
The court disagreed, writing that because SEQRA’s 
definition of “environment” encompasses “existing patterns 
of population concentration, distribution or growth, and exist-
ing community or neighborhood character,”73 any effect that a 
project might cause on “population patterns or existing com-
munity character . . . is a relevant concern in an environmental 
analysis.”74
The court admitted that because the proposed construction 
was on a vacant lot, it displaced no residents or businesses.75 But 
the court nevertheless found that SEQRA required the city to 
consider the risk of “long-term secondary displacement of resi-
dents and businesses in determining whether a proposed project 
may have a significant effect on the environment.”76 Although 
the court did not define the term “secondary displacement,” 
other commentators use the term to describe the possibility that 
new construction might make a neighborhood more desirable 
and thus increase rents, which in turn might force some current 
residents to move.77 Thus, the court suggested that the proposed 
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new construction (combined with likely construction on other 
nearby sites)78 might lead to such secondary displacement, and 
that this possibility could require an EIS.
At a minimum, Chinese Staff I suggests that whenever new 
development might make a neighborhood more valuable, thus 
creating a risk of increased rents, the lead agency must consider 
this fact in deciding whether to draft an EIS. More broadly, 
Chinese Staff I implies that any change in existing “popula-
tion patterns” is an environmental impact under SEQRA and 
thus if significant, requires an EIS. It logically follows that any 
development that significantly increases neighborhood popula-
tion requires an EIS because new housing by definition affects 
population patterns.
More recent New York appellate cases support this interpre-
tation of Chinese Staff I. For example, in Fisher v. Giuliani,79 
the city allowed landowners within the city’s Theater District 
to transfer development rights from 
land containing several historic the-
aters to nearby parcels, thus allow-
ing the landowners to build taller 
buildings on the latter parcels.80 The 
lead agency refused to draft an EIS, 
reasoning that the zoning change 
would merely “accommodate the 
projected demand for [office] space 
[but] would not change the overall 
demand,”81 and would not affect the 
neighborhood’s traffic patterns or 
social composition.82
The court agreed, 83 writing that the opponents of the city’s 
new rules “failed to provide any meaningful evidence that the 
[change] . . . would be significant enough to spur development 
beyond that which would in any event take place.”84 This lan-
guage suggests that an EIS was unnecessary precisely because 
the rezoning was unlikely to spur development. It logically fol-
lows that if the city’s policies had increased development, the 
court would have required an EIS.
In Chinese Staff I and Workers Association v. Burden 
(“Chinese Staff II”),85 the New York courts also refused to 
require an EIS, but emphasized that the rezoning at issue would 
not increase population. In that case, the city of New York 
rezoned a Brooklyn neighborhood and declined to draft an 
EIS.86 A citizen group argued that the rezoning required an EIS 
because the city “underestimate[d] the opportunities for market-
rate development . . . [and] the new types of businesses [caused 
by rezoning].”87 The city disagreed, claiming that the rezoning 
would lead to a net increase of only 75 housing units and thus 
created no significant impact.88
The court held that the city’s finding of no significant impact 
was rational for two reasons. First, the rezoning “was decreas-
ing, rather than increasing, the potential for development by 
imposing building height limits.”89 Second, because “the [city] 
projected an increase of only 75 units, it was [reasonable] to 
conclude that the rezoning would not have any adverse socio-
economic impacts.”90
The Chinese Staff II court’s emphasis on the small num-
ber of added housing units and on the decreased potential for 
development implies that any zoning decision that does add a 
significant number of new businesses or housing units to a 
neighborhood is likely to create significant impact and thus to 
require an EIS under SEQRA—a rule consistent with Chinese 
Staff I and Fisher.
B. Does Greenfield Development Usually Require an 
EIS?
Because significant infill development by definition 
increases the number of housing units and businesses in a 
neighborhood, it is likely to require an EIS under SEQRA. By 
contrast, greenfield development is further removed from exist-
ing residential neighborhoods. Although the law is not clear on 
this point,91 it could be argued that such development is less 
likely to affect population patterns or 
neighborhood character. Therefore, 
greenfield development might be 
less likely to require an EIS than 
infill development.
Even if this is not the case, in 
practice SEQRA may burden infill 
development more than greenfield 
development. Infill development 
by definition occurs in places with 
many neighbors. And where there 
are neighbors, there is often “Not in 
My Back Yard” (“NIMBY”)92 resis-
tance to development.93 NIMBY 
resistance occurs because residents of an existing neighborhood 
may suffer any perceived costs from new development (e.g., 
increased traffic, changes in neighborhood look and feel) while 
the benefits of new development, such as an increased supply 
of housing, are citywide or regionwide.94 Dissatisfied neighbor-
hood activists thus have a strong motive to use SEQRA to delay 
new development.95
Of course, residents of rural and suburban areas may share 
such motives with urbanites. However, development in low-
density areas by definition occurs in places with fewer neighbors 
than infill development. For example, if 1,000 people live within 
a mile of Rural Development X and 20,000 people live within 
a mile of Urban Development Y, the former development has 
fewer neighbors—and where there are few neighbors, there are 
few potential NIMBY issues.96 And where there are few poten-
tial NIMBY issues, there are fewer people who are likely to file 
suit if the government refuses to file an EIS or complain that an 
existing EIS is inadequate. Thus, even if the law treats infill and 
greenfield development equally, SEQRA makes infill develop-
ment more difficult because, all other factors being equal, neigh-
borhood activists are more likely to generate SEQRA-related 
litigation for infill sites.
“. . . in practice 
SEQRA may burden 
infill development 
more than greenfield 
development.”
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Iv. why seqra’s bIas Is  
envIronmenTally harmFul
It could be argued that SEQRA’s bias against infill has little 
relevance to public policy, either because (1) SEQRA rarely pre-
vents development that a city wants to approve or (2) infill devel-
opment is no more environmentally beneficial than greenfield 
development. Neither argument justifies the status quo because 
(1) SEQRA adds costs even to development that government 
ultimately approves and (2) infill development produces less 
driving and thus less pollution than greenfield development.
A. How SEQRA Makes Infill More Difficult
Admittedly, SEQRA does not prevent a municipality from 
permitting development with significant environmental impact. 
Because SEQRA allows government agencies to balance envi-
ronmental impacts against other social considerations, litigants 
are rarely able to persuade courts to stop a project completely, as 
opposed to delaying the project by requiring an EIS.97
Nevertheless, SEQRA imposes a significant burden upon 
developers. For a developer, “time is money”98 because a devel-
oper will often be paying interest on a construction loan while 
its project is being debated but will be unable to receive money 
from buyers or renters until the project is actually built.99 Thus, a 
developer suffers financially by waiting for government officials 
to review environmental impact statements and similar docu-
ments, some of which include hundreds of pages of analysis.100
Both the EIS process and related litigation may take years 
to complete.101 For example, in one recent case, a landowner 
requested a zoning change in August 2008; the municipality 
did not adopt a final EIS until November 2010; an opponent 
of the project challenged the EIS a month later; and the case 
was not decided until March 2012.102 In another more difficult 
case, the environmental review 
process began in late 2007, about 
a year and a half before the final 
EIS in 2009, and more than three 
years before the final decision in 
2011.103
In truly large-scale develop-
ments, the EIS project may take 
more than five years. In 2005, a 
New York City agency prepared an 
environmental assessment form for 
the Atlantic Yards project, which 
plans to develop a 22-acre parcel 
near downtown Brooklyn.104 
The final environmental impact 
statement was issued in 2006.105 But after years of litigation, a 
New York appellate court ordered the government to prepare a 
supplemental EIS in 2012—seven years after the environmental 
review process began.106
In sum, even an environmental review process that ulti-
mately allows a project makes development more time-consum-
ing and thus more costly. And if, as noted above, SEQRA may 
disproportionately affect infill development, SEQRA may make 
infill especially costly.
B. Why Making Infill More Difficult Is 
Environmentally Harmful
Given that all legislation has disproportionate impacts 
upon someone, should we care whether SEQRA penalizes infill 
development? Or to ask the question more precisely: is there any 
environmental cost to penalizing infill as opposed to greenfield 
development?
Already-developed areas, especially in urban cores, tend 
to have more mass transit riders and fewer drivers than green-
field areas.107 This is because as a neighborhood becomes more 
developed, it becomes more compact; that is, more people live 
within walking distance of shops, jobs, public transit, and other 
neighborhood destinations.108 By contrast, in areas with lower 
density, very few people will live within a short walk of a bus or 
train stop, making transit ridership low,109 which in turn disin-
clines transit agencies to serve such areas.110
It follows that more greenfield development means more 
driving—and more driving means more pollution, since one-
third of U.S. greenhouse gas emissions come from automo-
biles.111 In addition, automobiles introduce a wide variety of 
other dangerous pollutants, such as carbon monoxide, ozone, 
and particulate matter.112 Public transit pollutes less than cars 
because each additional rider on a bus or train adds no pollution, 
while each additional driver adds some.113 It follows that because 
infill development requires less driving, more infill development 
means less pollution.
It could be argued that the positive effects of infill-induced 
density are outweighed by the environmental harm caused by 
increased traffic congestion. According to this argument, higher 
density packs more people, and 
thus more cars, into smaller spaces 
making a city’s roads more con-
gested and polluted. 114
But as American cities and 
suburbs have become less dense, 
no corresponding reduction in 
congestion has occurred. Between 
1982 and 1997, population den-
sity in U.S. metropolitan areas 
decreased by 15.7%.115 Out of 
281 metropolitan areas116 only 16 
became more densely populated 
during this period.117 Nevertheless, 
the average metropolitan area lost 
more than twice as many hours per person to congestion in 1997 
than in 1982 (33.8 hours, up from 14.4 in 1982).118
Some studies support the view that on balance, compact 
development reduces pollution. A recent study sponsored by 
the U.S. Department of Energy suggests that compact, transit-
oriented development reduces greenhouse gas emissions by 
reducing driving. 119 In particular, the study found that:
“But as American 
cities and suburbs have 
become less dense, 
no corresponding 
reduction in congestion 
has occurred.”
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1.  Doubling residential density, without more, 
reduces household vehicle miles traveled by 
five to twelve percent.120 If increased density 
was accompanied by other pro-transit land use 
policies and by improved public transit, driving 
miles could be reduced by as much as twenty-five 
percent.121
2.  These reductions in driv-
ing would, in turn, reduce 
greenhouse gas emis-
sions. If increased den-
sity and improved public 
transit caused Americans 
to drive twenty-five per-
cent fewer miles, U.S. 
greenhouse gas emis-
sions could be reduced 
by eight to eleven per-
cent by 2050.122
Similarly, Harvard econo-
mist Edward Glaeser and UCLA 
economist Matthew Kahn recently conducted a study which 
found that low-density, automobile-oriented places emitted more 
greenhouse gases from transportation than more pedestrian 
and transit-oriented places.123 For example, New York City, the 
region with the highest use of public transit,124 emitted only 
19,524 pounds of carbon dioxide (“CO2”), a major greenhouse 
gas,125 per household from automobiles and transit users com-
bined126—the lowest amount among ten metropolitan areas 
studied. By contrast, several auto-oriented, lower-density regions 
emitted over 25,000 pounds of transportation-related CO2 per 
household.127
Moreover, suburbs, which tend to be less compact and more 
automobile-oriented,128 have significantly higher per-household 
CO2 emissions from transportation. For example, New York’s 
suburban households emitted over 3,800 more pounds of trans-
portation-related CO2 per household than did city residents.
129 
Thus, the alleged congestion-related benefits of low-density 
greenfield development are apparently offset by the environmen-
tal harm caused by increased driving and resulting increases in 
greenhouse gas emissions.
If, as suggested above, infill development reduces driving 
and thus reduces pollution, and SEQRA discourages infill devel-
opment, it seems that SEQRA actually increases driving and the 
resulting pollution.
Even under SEQRA’s broad definition of the “environment,” 
SEQRA is not environmentally friendly. In Chinese Staff I, 
the court held that environmental impact includes “secondary 
displacement”—displacement of a neighborhood’s existing 
residents by higher rents.130 The court’s language suggests that 
higher rents themselves are a harmful environmental impact.
But to the extent SEQRA discourages new residential devel-
opment, it reduces housing supply. And according to the law of 
supply and demand, the less of something that is built, the higher 
its price will be.131 Thus, SEQRA may actually increase rents 
and other housing prices, thus creating environmental damage 
by its own criteria.
v. soluTIons
Of course, SEQRA is basically pro-environmental legisla-
tion and is sometimes used to delay projects with truly harmful 
environmental consequences.132 On the other hand, SEQRA may 
actually discourage environmen-
tally friendly infill development. 
Can New York eliminate SEQRA’s 
negative consequences without 
eliminating SEQRA’s desirable 
limits on development?
SEQRA can be made less 
burdensome either through reforms 
directly focused on the most envi-
ronmentally friendly types of infill 
development or through reforms 
addressing SEQRA as a whole. 
Each avenue of reform will be 
addressed in turn.
A. Infill Exceptions: Learning from California
In 2008,133 California amended its little NEPA statute,134 
the California Environmental Quality Act (“CEQA”)135 to 
streamline CEQA review for transit-oriented projects.136 The 
state later issued regulations to implement these amendments.137
CEQA defines a “transit priority project” as one that is pre-
dominantly residential, provides a minimum density of at least 
twenty dwelling units per acre, and is within a half mile of major 
transit service, such as a bus or train with service intervals of no 
more than fifteen minutes during peak hours.138 Such a project 
is completely exempt from CEQA if it meets an extensive set 
of requirements. In particular, the project must: (1) be no larger 
than eight acres or two hundred dwelling units; (2) be served by 
existing utilities; (3) have buildings fifteen percent more energy-
efficient than required under current law; (4) achieve twenty-five 
percent less water use than the average household in its region; 
and (5) provide one of the following: (a) five acres of open 
space, or (b) a significant amount of low or moderate-income 
housing, defined as providing 20% of its units to moderate-
income housing, 10% to low-income housing, or 5% to very 
low-income housing.139 This exception to CEQA is so strict that 
it is unlikely to be used significantly.140 In particular, the require-
ments of low-income housing reduce developer profitability, and 
are thus unlikely to be used frequently by private developers.141 
Moreover, the requirement of five acres of open space would 
not be feasible in many urban locations, since buildings in cities 
such as New York City are often surrounded by other buildings 
rather than by open space.142
Transit priority projects that do not meet the requirements 
for a complete exception143 still benefit from CEQA—govern-
ment must review such projects under a “sustainable commu-
nities environmental assessment” (“SCEA”),144 which is less 
onerous than traditional SEQRA review.145 Under a SCEA, a 
“On the other 






developer need not address potential growth-inducing impacts 
of a project, nor need it address possible car and truck traffic 
induced by the project.146 In addition, the developer need not 
discuss the pros and cons of a lower-density alternative to the 
project.147
But, the SCEA exception is highly limited; it only applies 
if the project includes mitigation measures already incorpo-
rated in prior environmental impact statements, such as an EIS 
related to the comprehensive plan of the community allowing 
the project.148 Given the limitations that CEQA imposes upon 
regulatory streamlining, New York would not make SEQRA less 
burdensome merely by borrowing California law word-for-word.
However, New York could borrow parts of CEQA. In par-
ticular, I propose that New York: (a) borrow CEQA’s definition 
of transit priority projects, and (b) borrow CEQA’s provision 
that developers of such projects need not address environmental 
impacts related to growth, such as increased population or traf-
fic. Thus, SEQRA as amended would, in transit-oriented areas, 
overrule the language of Chinese Staff I and Fisher that urban 
growth justifies an EIS, on the ground that growth of areas well-
served by public transit is environmentally helpful rather than 
environmentally harmful.
Byron Toma, an environmental and transit lawyer, criticizes 
CEQA’s streamlining for transit priority projects on the ground 
that “[b]uilding high-density housing without adequate transit 
capacity and quality is a serious planning blunder.”149 Toma sug-
gests that if transit agencies do not increase service as a mitiga-
tion measure, transit systems may become overloaded.150 This 
argument should not prevent reform for two reasons. First, any 
area with sufficient transit service to be eligible for a transit pri-
ority project by definition has a fairly significant level of transit 
service. Second, if improved transit must come before density, 
neither the transit nor the density may ever get built. In an area 
where density is low and transit ridership is therefore already 
low,151 transit opponents will argue that the density is not present 
to support transit, and that transit should accordingly never be 
expanded, even if it already exists.152 And where there is weak 
transit service as a result of low density, compact development 
will be even more unpopular: Opponents to development could 
argue that, in the absence of transit, more density will only lead 
to more congestion.153
In sum, limiting SEQRA review of transit-friendly develop-
ment to truly environmental concerns as opposed to concerns 
related to population growth would be an environmentally 
friendly policy, because it would contribute to steering growth to 
infill sites served by public transit, thus increasing transit rider-
ship and reducing auto-related pollution.
B. More Aggressive Reforms
Stewart Sterk, a land-use law professor, proposes to reduce 
the burden of SEQRA upon the housing market through two 
reforms. First, Sterk proposes to make SEQRA less burdensome 
by exempting local zoning decisions from SEQRA.154 The public 
benefit of this proposal is that neighborhood activists would no 
longer be able to delay new homes and businesses on essentially 
nonenvironmental grounds, and the burden of SEQRA paper-
work and SEQRA-related litigation would thus be lifted from 
the shoulders of local governments and developers.155 And 
because, as explained above in Part III,156 SEQRA is probably 
more burdensome for urban developers than for rural and sub-
urban landowners, this proposal probably would increase infill 
and thus decrease pollution. On the other hand, this proposal 
might prevent the public from discovering a few truly significant 
environmental impacts that are uncovered through the SEQRA 
process. Thus, it is unclear whether this proposal’s environmen-
tal benefits outweigh its costs.
Second, Sterk proposes157 amending SEQRA to exclude 
socio-economic impacts from the statute’s definition of “envi-
ronment,” thus eliminating review of the social effects of 
projects.158 Sterk reasons that disputes among socio-economic 
impacts are political rather than technical, and that environmen-
tal review of such issues therefore adds nothing to the decision-
making process.159 If this proposal were adopted, SEQRA, like 
NEPA, would only address a project’s effects upon the physical 
environment.160
Like Sterk’s other proposal, this reform would make 
SEQRA less burdensome and thus facilitate development gener-
ally. And like the California statute discussed above, it would 
focus regulatory scrutiny on traditionally environmental impacts. 
But unlike the California statute, Sterk’s proposal would not 
be targeted towards transit-oriented development or even infill 
development generally. Thus, the merits of Sterk’s proposal 
may depend on the state’s priorities: does the state only value 
transit-oriented development, or does it value regulatory relief 
for all landowners? From a purely environmental perspective, 
something resembling California law might be more desirable; 
however, a broader reform might make housing more affordable 
by facilitating both infill and greenfield development, which is 
also a desirable goal.
vI. conclusIon
The purpose of SEQRA is to protect the environment by 
requiring the government to consider the harmful environmental 
impacts of its actions. But SEQRA in fact creates its own harm-
ful environmental impacts. Thanks to SEQRA, someone who 
wants to build houses or apartments in an already-developed city 
or inner suburb must sometimes spend years going through the 
EIS process.
As noted above, greenfield development in low-density rural 
areas and outer suburbs has fewer neighbors, and thus fewer pos-
sible opponents to development. It therefore appears that in rela-
tion to infill development, greenfield development may be less 
likely to require an EIS or lead to litigation over the adequacy 
of an EIS. Thus, SEQRA discourages infill development in New 
York and encourages developers to either build on greenfield 
sites or move to other states. Because greenfield development 
typically leads to more driving and thus more pollution, SEQRA 
may actually increase rather than decrease pollution.
SEQRA can be made more environmentally friendly in two 
ways. At a minimum, the New York state legislature could target 
22 SuStainable Development law & policy
the most environmentally friendly projects for SEQRA relief by 
limiting environmental review for compact developments near 
public transit. More radical options would include encouraging 
all development by exempting all zoning permits from SEQRA, 
or by limiting SEQRA review to a project’s impacts upon the 
physical environment. 
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